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"Justice's beautiful face":
Bob Sadoff and the redemptive
promise of therapeutic
jurisprudence
BY MICHAEL L. PERLIN, J.D.

Therapeuticjurisprudence (TJ) provides a frameworkfor
psycholegal analysis that has had no difficulty in attracting
adherents within the law and a broad range of health-oriented
disciplines. Although psychiatry has proven perhapspredictably
less willing to embrace TJ, the work of Robert L. Sadoff M.D.
provides a heartening exception. Dr. Sadoff's careerstands
for many enlightening principles-notleast of which is the
redemptive promise of TJ.
KEY WORDS: Forensic psychiatry, legal education, professional

ethics, therapeuticjurisprudence.

I first met Bob Sadoff on a snowy day in my then-office in
Trenton over 40 years ago.' Since then, we have worked
together-and continue to do so-professionally in every
imaginable way,2 and we have shared life cycle events from
AUTHORS' NOTE: For additional information about this article,please
contact Professor Michael L. Perlin, New York Law School, 185 West
Broadway, New York, NY 10013. E-Mail: michael.perlin@nyls.edu. The
author wishes to thank Alison Lynch for her helpful research assistance.
@ 2012 by Federal Legal Publications,Inc.
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bar and bat mitzvahs to weddings to baseball games.' This
article, though, will focus only on one aspect of our
relationship, and one that has not been the focus of much
prior attention: the mutuality of purpose that we both have
found in the way that therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) values
synergistically inform and support the relationship between
forensic expert and counsel in the litigation and pre-trial
processes. I began this article as I did simply to reinforce
the connectivity in our careers, and to underscore how my
relationship with Bob is among the few most important of
my professional (and personal) life (lives). And part of that
relationship is Bob's commitment-both as a scholar and as
an expert witness 4-to the values of care, the avoidance of
harm, and the well-being of those who come in contact with
the forensic system, commitments that resonate in the TJ
literature.
In this article, I will first briefly explain the meaning of
therapeutic jurisprudence. Next, I will look at Bob's writing
that has been explicitly about TJ, to be followed by (a) a
consideration of Bob's other writing that has clearly been
inspired by his adherence to TJ principles (although those
are not necessarily specified), and (b) a consideration of
some of the reported litigated cases in which Bob has
testified in which his testimony reflects TJ values. I will
conclude with some thoughts about Bob's contributions in
this area, coupled with some speculations as to why so few
forensic psychiatrists ever write from this perspective.'

The meaning of TJ
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of
the past two decades has been the creation and dynamic
growth of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ). 6 Initially employed
in cases involving individuals with mental disabilities, but
subsequently expanded far beyond that narrow area,
therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model for assessing
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the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a
therapeutic agent, the law that can have therapeutic or
antitherapeutic consequences.' The ultimate aim of
therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal rules,
procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to
enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating
due process principles.' There is an inherent tension in this
inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identifies how it must be
resolved: "the law's use of "mental health information to
improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon
justice concerns."' As I have written elsewhere, "An inquiry
into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic
concerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties."'o
Therapeutic jurisprudence "asks us to look at law as it
actually impacts people's lives"" and focuses on the law's
influence on emotional life and psychological well-being. 2
It suggests that "law should value psychological health,
should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic
consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with
other values served by law should attempt to bring about
healing and wellness.""3 By way of example, therapeutic
jurisprudence "aims to offer social science evidence that
limits the use of the incompetency label by narrowly
defining its use and minimizing its psychological and social
disadvantage." 4
In recent years, scholars have considered a vast range of
topics through a therapeutic jurisprudence lens, including,
but not limited to, all aspects of mental disability law,
domestic relations law, criminal law and procedure,
employment law, gay rights law, and tort law." As Ian
Freckelton has noted, "it is a tool for gaining a new and
distinctive perspective utilizing socio-psychological insights
into the law and its applications."' 6 It is also part of a
growing comprehensive movement in the law towards
establishing more humane and psychologically optimal
ways of handling legal issues collaboratively, creatively, and
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respectfully." These alternative approaches optimize the
psychological well-being of individuals, relationships, and
communities dealing with a legal matter, and acknowledge
concerns beyond strict legal rights, duties, and obligations.
In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance
rights, and promote well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence
has been described as "...a sea-change in ethical thinking

about the role of law.. .a movement towards a more distinctly
relational approach to the practice of law.. .which
emphasises psychological wellness over adversarial
triumphalism."" That is, therapeutic jurisprudence supports
an ethic of care."
One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is
a commitment to dignity. Ronner describes the "three Vs":
voice, validation and voluntariness,2 arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have
a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker.
If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to,
heard, and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a
sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace
with the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary
participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding
as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants
that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered

the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their
own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior
in the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel that
they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions.2 '
Bob's writing-Bob's professional life-seeks to elevate the
importance of these "three Vs" in the entire forensic/legal
process.

Bob Sadoff's writings on therapeutic jurisprudence
Over 30 years ago, in a chapter in a book on violence, murder, and aggression, Bob and I said this about the connec-
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tion between law and mental health: "The intersection of
law and mental health stands at a significant focal point in
the development of human behavior, at a point where
motives, intents, and drives can and must be examined in
the contexts of rights, obligations, duties and the social
order."22 Certainly, these early views were consonant with
what came to be known as therapeutic jurisprudence. In
1993, I put together a symposium on therapeutic jurisprudence at New York Law School. I believe it is the first such
symposium ever presented at a law school in this nation. Of
course, David Wexler and Bruce Winick came and pre2
sented,"
as did other prominent law professors, 24 law practi25
tioners, and forensic psychologists. 26 But Bob Sadoff also
came to offer the perspective of the forensic psychiatrist. 27
This is one of the very few articles ever by a forensic psychiatrist directly about this topic; interestingly, the others
also appear mostly in nonmedical journals.
When I reread this article as part of my preparation for this
article, I was struck both by Bob's prescience and how,
immediately, he grasped the most significant tension in TJ.
In the second paragraph of this piece, he asks two back-toback questions:
Is the decision made in keeping with the patient's best interest?
Does the patient have autonomy in this particular case or is the
patient the product of the paternalistic mental health system?29
And, in the final paragraph of this article:
The notion [of TJ] is sound as long as it is applied consistently
and pursued by the courts where mentally ill clients, defendants or
plaintiffs, are involved. However, the rights of patients and the
needs of the law are not always in concert with therapeutic principles regarding the best medical interest of the individuals concerned."
Here, Bob sets up one of the issues at the heart of the TJ
inquiry (and also, not coincidentally, perhaps the root of the
basic criticism that TJ was "paternalistic," perhaps auguring

270

Bob's other
writings from
an (unspoken)
TJ
perspective

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE

a return to a therapeutic state)": Can a legal system be
"therapeutic" and still support and privilege autonomy? The
debate on this question is still with us 18 years later.32
Bob's piece was also extraordinarily prescient as to the
ultimate impact of TJ. Although TJ began as solely an
interpretive tool to answer questions of mental disability
law, he saw its potential impact on such areas as domestic
relations, personal injury, substantive criminal law,
correctional law, and sex offender law." In a recent article
reviewing 2 decades of TJ scholarship, Wexler specifically
earmarked "the advance of therapeutic jurisprudence from
its starting point in mental health law to its present
involvement in the entire legal spectrum."" Bob intuitively
and immediately saw these broad applications not from his
academic perspective, I don't think, but from his work as an
expert witness in all of these areas of the law. And certainly,
time has borne out his insights."
One of the basic tenets of TJ is the avoidance of harm:
"Interactions with the justice system necessarily have an
impact on an individual's psychological or emotional wellbeing and that the system should be designed to minimize
emotional or psychological harm and maximize benefit to
the extent possible consistent with other system
objectives."36 TJ also calls for a careful consideration of the
ethical roles of all participants in the forensic mental health
system. In an article I wrote with Professor Keri Gould over
a decade ago about the impact of TJ on clinical teaching, we
noted that TJ requires an "examination of and eventual
tinkering with the roles and behavior of judges and
attorneys so that those persons may perform in a fashion
that meshes with professional ethics and yet is
therapeutically beneficial."" TJ also mandates "increased
attention to race, ethnicity, and culturally competent
practice in the lawyer-client relationship."" Further, TJ
serves as a bulwark against bias, offering "an avenue to
transform the way the criminal justice system deals with
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mentally ill offenders from a system rooted in stereotypical
bias against the mentally ill to a system that preserves due
process principles, while also focusing on healing."" TJ also
demands that principles of informed consent be
"authentically" honored.40 Also, TJ considers the contours of
forensic testimony and of the relationship between factfinders and expert witnesses.4 1 A consideration of Bob's
other writings reveals that these issues are core to his
scholarship and professional persona.
In his most recent book, Ethical Issues in Forensic
Psychiatry: Minimizing Harm,4 2 Bob begins by noting that
his book is about "the inherent harm that may be caused in
the practice of forensic psychiatry,"43 and that the forensic
psychiatrist must consciously seek to minimize harm in the
conduct of examinations and evaluations." He emphasizes
how the forensic process can be harmful to the examinee
(by including certain information in the report,4 5 by using
certain words in the report, by giving opinions not based
on scientific evidence)" as well as to the examiner," and
lists multiple substantive situations (e.g., examination of
children; examination of individuals claiming sexual
harassment; examination of persons with mental retardation)
in which harm can come to the examinee.4 9 He extensively
discusses the need for cultural knowledge and how cultural
differences must be accounted for in forensic evaluations.50
Stressing that the judicial system is not a therapeutic one,'
he nonetheless argues (persuasively) that the forensic
examination has therapeutic potential,52 and concludes that
the forensic expert-once in the courtroom-must become a
teacher."
In other writings, Bob warns about the pitfalls of personal
bias on the part of the forensic expert, stressing that forensic
psychiatrists with negative feelings about certain defendants
(based on race or ethnicity) should not be involved in such a
person's case." Elsewhere, in writing about repressed
memory treatments, he warns about the need to obtain
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informed consent before embarking on experimental
treatments (e.g., hypnosis, sodium amytal) as part of the
forensic evaluation."" In 1983, in writing about the right to
refuse treatment (at a time when mainstream psychiatric
opposition to that right was virulent)," he endorsed a
"cooperative model to help resolve disputes [related to]
ethical conflicts."" In discussing the vexing problem of the
role of the forensic psychiatrist in death penalty competency
determinations, he cautions-in total consonance with TJ
principles-that "the psychiatrist must know the extent and
limitations of his or her expertise and maintain ethical
standards while making a significant contribution to the
court."" And again, and again, he focuses on the ethical
issues that permeate the entire forensic process-with
regard to personal bias," agency relationships,6 0 and the
entire civil commitment process."
Not insignificantly, practicing lawyers and law professors
have embraced Bob's insights. Professor Daniel Shuman, in
a commentary on Troxel v. Granville,'2 a grandparent
visitation case, has noted, citing Bob's TJ piece: "For many
mental health professionals, therapeutic jurisprudence
represents an overdue attention to the unintended mental
and emotional harm that the law often produces and its
squandered therapeutic potential." Janet Abisch, in an
article endorsing a meditational approach to civil
commitment representation, has drawn on Bob's work on
ethical dilemmas and the dilemma of power imbalances in
involuntary hospital settings: "As hospital administrators
control virtually all aspects of the system-access, time,
conditions of confinement, communications-a power
imbalance is created, making it almost impossible for

lawyers to deal with their clients, to confront witnesses, or
to develop proofs without abandoning their best interests
stance for a more adversarial, confrontational one."" Elaine
Dahl, in an article discussing the Montana Supreme Court's
decision in In Re K.G.E, articulating an expansive role of
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lawyers in civil commitment cases,' has drawn on the same
piece as did Abisch: "Scholars have frequently decried the
lack of guidance for counsel in involuntary commitment
proceedings, noting that cases, statutes, and codes of
professional responsibility provide little or no assistance."6
In short, Bob's thoughts about therapeutic jurisprudenceboth when he references TJ and where he does not-have
had a significant impact on the legal academy."7
In case law

I turn my attention now to the topic of case law. Bob has
evaluated over 10,000 defendants in criminal cases,"6 a truly
astounding number. And, equally astonishing, the decisions
in at least 212 cases in which he testified have been
published.69 What can we learn from these?
There are limitations to the scope of this inquiry, of course.
An expert witness in a criminal or personal injury or
disability case will not announce to the court that he or she
has approached a case from a therapeutic jurisprudence
perspective."o But I believe that a careful reading of the case
law may illuminate the extent to which TJ values-even sub
silentio-have had an impact on the witness's testimony.
By way of example, in State v. Sheppard," a criminal
prosecution involving a sexual attack on a 10-year-old child,
Bob testified that he believed the victim had the capacity to
testify truthfully, but-in testimony that reflects the essence
of TJ principlesn2-he concluded that avoidance of an incourt appearance through the use of video equipment would
improve the accuracy of her testimony. These were the
reasons he offered:
An adult witness, testifying in court, surrounded by the usual court
atmosphere, aware of a black-robed judge, a jury, attorneys, members of the public, uniformed attendants, a flag, and religious overtones, is more likely to testify truthfully. The opposite is true of a
child, particularly when the setting involves a relative accused by
her of sexual abuse. She becomes fearful, guilty, anxious, and trau-
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matized. In most cases, she will have been exposed to both pleasant and abusive associations with the accused. As a consequence,
she has ambivalent feelings. Anger against the relative is opposed
by feelings of care, not only for him but also for other family members who may be harmed by a conviction. There is guilt as well as
satisfaction in the prospect of sending the abuser to prison. These
mixed feelings, accompanied by the fear, guilt, and anxiety, mitigate the truth, producing inaccurate testimony. The video arrangement, because it avoids courtroom stress, relieves these feelings,
thereby improving the accuracy of the testimony."
This is a question that has been the topic of significant
scholarly commentary in subsequent years," but I have not
been able to find an earlier suggestion in the case law in
which an expert witness took this position.
Questions of power also play a part in Bob's testimony. In
State v. Nelson," a death penalty case involving a
transsexual defendant, Bob made it clear that he was, again,
in court as an educator, not a partisan,"6 and that he "did not
consider himself a member of the prosecution's team.""
Although, ironically, the conviction in this case was
reversed in significant part because of the prosecutor's
juxtaposing that testimony with the testimony of the defense
witness (who considered himself a member of the "defense
team")," Bob's testimony, standing alone, certainly is a
reflection of core TJ values.
Bob is comfortable testifying that he does not have enough
information to form an expert opinion to a reasonable
medical certainty." In one case-dealing with the question
of whether a defendant was competent to be executedsohe testified that he had part of the information he needed,
but not all of it:
Based on my limited and abbreviated one hour examination of
Antuan Bronshtein plus review of the records noted, I can state,
within reasonable medical certainty, that Mr. Bronshtein appears
to have an intellectual ability to understand that he is being put to
death for a particular reason, i.e., the conviction for murder of
Alexander Guttman [sic]. I am not certain about his emotional
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appreciation of the conditions in which he finds himself and his
ability to work effectively and rationally with counsel with respect
to his current situation....
Thus, my opinion at this time is deferred until a further examination, where I may probe more deeply into Mr. Bronshtein's emotional condition and his reasons for seeking the death penalty as
quickly as possible.'
TJ rejects the notion of expert omniscience." Bob's
testimony in cases such as these reflects a strict adherence
to this position.
Bob has also offered creative solutions to seemingly
intractable problems in the criminal court process.83 In
United States v. Rodriguez," in an incompetency hearing in
a counterfeiting conspiracy case, Bob concluded that the
defendant's misunderstandings were "more educational
issues than they [were] mental health issues and [could] be
restored through educational rehabilitation prior to trial."
(Id.), and that [the defendant's]"ability to work with
counsel" constituted "an issue that needs to be addressed,"
though with "proper education and training, it was
likely...that... Rodriguez would achieve [this] ability" (Id.).85
Following this testimony, the parties agreed to enroll
Rodriguez in a competency restoration process that included
the sort of training Bob had recommended." Bob's
recommendations in the Rodriguez case certainly reflect the
sort of non-adversarial approach to criminal justice urged by
some TJ commentators."
In short, Bob doesn't simply "talk the talk." As reflected in a
sampling of reported cases, he truly "walks the walk" as well.

Conclusion
So what conclusions can we draw from all this? It seems to
me that there are a few overarching points worthy of some
consideration:
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1.

Bob immediately "got" the significance of therapeutic
jurisprudence, as an interpretative tool, as a filter, and as a
structure for the forensic legal process.

2.

He intuitively knew that its ultimate value would transcend
the world of mental disability law, and that it would have
major impacts on virtually every other area of substantive
and procedural law.

3.

He incorporated his insights not solely in his TJ-specific
writings and his general law-and-psychiatry writings, but
into his testimony as well.

4.

Bob is, truly, nearly alone as a psychiatrist in his embrace
of TJ.

I need to add a few words on this final point, because it is so
troubling on so many levels. As I indicated above," there is
only a handful of articles by psychiatrists that are explicitly
TJ in orientation." Not only that: the literature seems to
assume that psychiatrists will not "take" to TJ. Writing
about potential TJ adopters, David Wexler notes, "Another
relevant community is that of social workers, criminologists,
psychologists, and the like" 0 ; Philip Gould and Patricia
Murrell have characterized TJ as a "catalyst for
interdisciplinary outreach, synthesizing the work of lawyers
and judges with that of criminologists, sociologists,
psychologists, philosophers, educators, and law professors."'
The absence of psychiatrists from these lists is, on one hand,
startling, but on the other, realistic.
There is some irony here, of course. From the onset of the
patients' rights movement, organized psychiatry has
complained long and loud about being "belegaled."" And
soon thereafter, David Wexler, making specific reference to
this position, noted that "the topic of the 'belegalment' of
various professionals seems highly suitable for a therapeutic
jurisprudence analysis."" Yet, psychiatrists have largely
been utterly silent about TJ and its potentially redemptive
powers to lessen some of the tensions between law and
psychiatry.'
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But Bob Sadoff is the major (practically, the lone)
exception. As with so many other aspects of the forensic
system and the law/psychiatry overlap, Bob "got it" early
on, and has stayed with it ever since. Although the words
"therapeutic jurisprudence" do not appear in his most recent
book," the book's focus on power, on avoidance of harm,
and on "the prevention of exploitation""6 of vulnerable
litigants by skilled experts is a perfect embodiment of TJ
values. It is more than sad that so few of Bob's fellow
professionals have taken up the same banner. My hope in
writing this article is that some will be convinced to do so.
I conclude by explaining the title of this paper. One of the
highlights of Bob Dylan's 1983 album Infidels is the
powerful song, I and I.9' At the end of the third verse, Dylan
sings: "Took a stranger to teach me, to look into justice's
beautiful face/And to see an eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth." The song may be, as Paul Williams suggests, a
reflection of a change in Dylan's persona since his previous
albums (released during his so-called Born Again period),
as it is profoundly influenced by the Old Testament."
Whether or not that is so, this coupletvacillating
between justice and vengeance-reflects the theme of the
song. And the phrase "justice's beautiful face" is key to an
understanding of the song, as justice must be a foundational
principle of religion.
So is "justice" the foundational principle of therapeutic
jurisprudence. David Wexler has explicitly linked TJ to the
concept of justice as a basic human need.' Bruce Winick
has argued that TJ must be "consistent with principles of
justice.'" Others have concluded that TJ "regards the law as
a social force that...will serve to promote justice,""0 and
remind us that TJ cannot be employed to subordinate due
process or "other justice values;" 02 TJ "raises our attention
to this and encourages us to see whether the law can be
made or applied in a more therapeutic way so long as other
values such as justice can be fully respected." 3 In a recent
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article, I suggested that TJ was the "school of jurisprudence
that can optimally redeem" mental disability law.'" Bob's
work can help attain this redemption.
Like Bob Dylan, Bob Sadoff understands this, embraces
this, and lives this. We are all extraordinarily lucky that he
is in our lives.

Notes

I discuss this in Michael L. Perlin, "May He Stay Forever Young":
Robert Sadoff and the History of Mental Health Law, 33 J. AMER.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 236 (2005).
2

These include, but are certainly not limited to:

*

Bob has been a witness in many cases that I have litigated (I discuss some of these in Perlin, supra note 1; see also, 4 MICHAEL L.
PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 8A-6.3,
at 88 (2d ed. 2002), discussing State v. Miller, Indictment No.
1869-71 (N.J. Mercer Cty. Ct. 1974), and Michael L. Perlin, Psychiatric Testimony in a Criminal Law Setting, 3 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 143, 1249 n. 20 (1975)(same) (Criminal Law Setting), and has been the inspiration for others (see Perlin, supra note
1, at 236, discussing Dixon v. Cahill, Docket No. L.30977/y-71
P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div. 1973), final order reprinted in 5
Perlin, supra, § 14-7, at 119-21 (2d ed. 2002).

*

We have tau2ht together and presented on panels together (from
1979 to 1984, we taught together as members of the Faculty for
Continuing Education in the Program in Psychiatry at the Institute
of the Pennsylvania Hospital (Philadelphia, PA); we have shared
the podium innumerable times at meetings of the American
Academy of Psychiatry and Law, the American Association of Law
Schools, the American Psychiatric Association, the International
Academy of Law and Mental Health, and other cross-professional
organizations).

*

We have made teaching tapes together (the sample direct and
cross-examination that I include in my Treatise (see 1 Perlin,
supra, § 2C-4.9, at 338-53 (2d ed. 1998)) is based on the Roland
Rodney tape that Bob and I created in the late 1970s pursuant to a
National Institute of Mental Health training project in conjunction
with the Center for Studies in Social-Legal Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania Medical School, which Bob then directed);
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Bob also made a series of teaching tapes for me and with me ("The
Case of Sharon Stevens"; "The Case of Darren Daniels") that I
used in classes at New York Law School from 1990-2004.
We have coauthored articles (e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (1982) (ethical

issues); Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, The Adversary System,
in VIOLENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON MURDER AND AGGRESSION 394 (Irwin

L. Kutash, Samuel B. Kutash, Louis B. Schlesinger eds., 1978)).
*

I have written chapters in books he has edited (e.g., Michael L.
Perlin, Recent Developments in Mental Health Law, in Psychiatric
Clinics of North America 539 (Robert Sadoff ed. 1983);Michael L.
Perlin, Competency to Stand Trial, in Crime and Mental Illness: A
Guide to Courtroom Practice 23 (Robert Sadoff & Frank Dattillio
eds., 2008)).

*

He has served on monitoring committees of cases I have litigated
(see Perlin, supra note 1, at 243 (discussing the monitoring committee in Doe v. Klein, Docket No. L-12088-74 P.W. (N.J. Super.
Ct., Law Div. 1977), reported in 1 Ment. Dis. L. Rep. 425 (1977)
(Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital case, Morris Plains, NJ)).

*

I present regularly in his Practical Applications Seminar series at
the University of Pennsylvania Medical School (most recently, e.g.,
Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific: The Need for a
Disability Rights Tribunal to Give Life to the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Dec. 6, 2011)).

*

I have given a lecture in a series honoring Bob (International
Human Rights and Mental Health Law, at the Robert L. Sadoff
Lecture sponsored by the Section on Medicine, Ethics, and the
Law; Philadelphia College of Physicians (April 2009)), and one in
a series honorin2 his parents (The Right to Refuse Treatment, Adequacy of Counsel, and Evolving Changes in the Regulation of
Pharmacy, annual Max and Rose Sadoff Lecture, University of
Minnesota School of Pharmacy (April, 1996)).

*

Bob gave me my national start by inviting me to present at an
American Academy of Psychiatry and Law meetine in 1975 (see
CriminalLaw Setting, supra).

*

He has written about me in his books (see ROBERT L. SADOFF, ETHICAL ISSUES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: MINIMIZING HARM 73 (2011)).

*

I have written about him in my articles (see, e.g., Michael L. Perlin "They Keep It All Hid": The Ghettoization of Mental Disability
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Law and Its Implicationsfor Legal Education, 54 ST. Louis U. L. J.
857, 871 (2010) (Perlin, Ghettoization); Michael L. Perlin, A Law
of Healing, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 407, 417 (2000) (Perlin, Healing)).
I have written introductory forwards to two of his books (see
Michael L. Perlin, Foreword:New Directions in the Legal Regulation of the Mental Health Professions, in ROBERT SIMON & ROBERT
L. SADOFF, PSYCHIATRIC MALPRACTICE: CASES AND COMMENTS FOR
CLINICIANS IX (1992); Michael L. Perlin, Foreword, in ROBERT L.
SADOFF, LEGAL ISSUES IN THE CARE OF PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS: A
GUIDE FOR THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL XI (1982)).
*

I've even written an article in an earlier Festschrift honorine Bob
(see supra note 1).
I have attended the weddings of his son David and his daughter
Debbie, and he has attended the bar mitzvah of my son Alex and
the bat mitzvah of my daughter Julie (I couldn't find the invitation
lists to cite. Readers will have to take my word on this). We have
gone to major league baseball and NBA basketball games together
(The most notable of which being the 1979 Phils 23-22 victory
over the Cubs at Wrigley Field; see http://www.bloggingbaseball.com/2006/05/17/major-league-baseballs-wildest-gamesphillies-23-chicago-cubs-22-at-wrigley-field/. I must note that we
were at an American Psychiatric Association conference and Bob,
inexplicably, left before it was over, mentioning that he had to
present another paper. I stayed til the end). I still haven't had the
opportunity to attend a Bob Dylan concert with Bob, but I am still
working on that. The fact that they are both Minnesota boys adds a
certain je ne sais quoi to that possibility.
I cannot speak as to how he conducts his therapeutic sessions
although I do know that his expressed concerns about power
imbalances in forensic relationships speaks, even if sub silentio, to
therapeutic jurisprudence-the focus of this paper-as well. See
e.g., MINIMIZING HARM, supra note 2, at 101: "Expert witnesses
have a certain amount of power that must not be abused or misused
to the detriment of others' freedom or their lives" (emphasis
added).
The contrast here to forensic psychologists-who have widely
adopted TJ as a a scholarly topic and working approach-is
startling and puzzling. For a sampling of the robust literature by
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